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assurid, his expectation of life,
and the cost of carrying the insurance, with interest thereon, as well
as upon the amount of the debt.
. . . The rule we now announce
may not be the best, but we have
not been able to find a better, after
a most careful1 and anxious consideration of the question." The
case was twice argued, andthe conclusion reached must be regarded
as final.
Such is the doctrine, upon the
third point under discussion, as developed: by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The writer is not
aware that the precise question
mooted in. Ulrich v. Reinoehl has
been passed upon" in any other
jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania de-

cision must, therefore, be regarded
as in some sense a statement of the
general rule of American law upon'
the subject.
. The principal case, it will be
noted, recognizes the principles
above developed with respect to
the nature of the creditor's interest, the time at which it must subsist, and the amount of it. It is a
valuable addition to the line of
cases cited, inasmuch as it dCcides
that the existence of the interest
and the amount of it must be
affirmatively proved bythe alleged
creditor, who will not be permitted
to recbvermerely'upon the strength
of a recital of the fact of the debt
in tfie'policy.
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WILLiAmSoN's ESTATE. SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA:
CollateralInheritanceTax-Conversion of Land Outside of State.
The real estate of testator lying in other States, which he has
directed his .executors to sell, and the proceeds from which he has given
to persons and objects in this State, are converted by the direction to
sell, and are subject to the collateral" inheritance tax. Miller v. Cornimonwealth,'iix Pa., 321, applied. MincHEnr,J.,dissented.
The material points of the will were as follows: "Item 13. I-will
and direct that the sum of three hundred thousand dollars shall be
paid by my executors to The Pennsylvania Company for Insurances
Owing to the absence of Judge ASHMAN it was impossible to submit this Annotation to him. The general editors are therefore solely
responsible for it.
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on Lives and Granting Annuities of the city of Philadelphia, as a
trustee and in special trust as follows, that after paying all proper
legal charges and expenses, said trustee shall pay the net income of said
fund on the first day of N4ovember in each year to the following-named
charitable institutions and associations of the city of Philadelphia, which
income they shall expend for the charitable uses and purposes for which
such institutions or associations were established; it being understood
that my executors in their discretion may pay to said trustee said three
hundred thousand dollars in money or good interest-bearing securities,
or productive real estate at a fair valuation to be affixed by the executors,
or in good dividend-paying stocks considered safe by them, as is further
provided in items sixteen and seventeen, to the provisions of which this
fund is made subject. . .
"cItem 14. The rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, wherever situated, vested, contingent or future, after
satisfying the foregoing bequests, as such remainder shall be realized
and converted into proper securities by my executors as provided in item
seventeenth of this will, shall be by them transferred and delivered to
The Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities, of this city, which company shall hold the same as a trustee and in
special trust . . - [for private beneficiaries.]
"Item 17.' . ,
And the executors shall make up the tru-t fund
provided for by item thirteenth for the benefit of the charities therein
named, by handing over to said trustee such securities and investnients
as they shall think best, or they may convey to the trustee in fee simple
any of my improved real estate, wherever situated, to be held in trust for
th- uses and purposes in said thirteenth itfm specified, at prices which
shall be fairly affixed and determined by the executors. And the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, consisting of bank and other stocks,
loans, lands and tenements, ground rents and all real, personal and
mixed property of every description, and wherever situated in this State
and elsewhere, and by whatever title held, whether vested, contingent,
present, or future, which may belong to me at the time of my decease,
I direct my executors to sell and convert into money (excepting only
such personal investments which they may deem suitable to enter into
the trust provided for in item fourteenth) and then reinvest the same in
such bonds, loans or other investments (excepting capital stocks of corporations or other companies only) as the executors may deem best for
the benefit and advantage of the residuary trust provided for in the fourteenth item of this will, and as such residuary portions of my estate
shall be so converted and reinvested by the executors, they will from
time to time hand over to the said trustee, to be by it held and disposed
of as in the fourteenth item provided, . . . And the net proceeds of
all such sales, as well as all rents and income derived from any part of
said property, shall constitute a part of my residuary estate, and be
invested as hereinbefore expressed.
.. . And I direct that my executors shall apply the proceeds of sales of real estate equally, and in like
manner with the proceeds of sales of personal estate in payment of all
or any of the bequests and legacies given by me. . ..
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STATEMENT. Op THE CASE.

The Commonwealth claimed the collateral inheritancp
tax upon the proceeds of the sale of lands in oth.er States,
,upon the ground that the direction to sell in'the seventeenth item worked a conversion of such lands. The
auditing judge allowed the claim, and on his adjudication
being confirmed by the Orphans' Court the, trustee took
this appeal.
OPINION BY WILLIAMS, J.-The lands of the testator
"lying in other States which he directed his executors to
sell, and the proceeds from which he gave to persons and
objects in this State, are converted by the direction to sell,
The fund being distributable here, is subject to the collateral inheritance tax under the rule stated in Miller v.
The Commonwealth, III Pa., 321.
MITCHELL, J.--I am unable to concur in the part of
this judgment which holds that the real estate in'other
States was subject to collateral inheritance tax. I cannot see
that a technical conversion gave this State any jurisdiction
for taxing purposes, under a statute not taxing the legatee
personally but the property •passing from the testator.
COLILATURAL INqHmiTAcz TAx-CoNv RSioN oit LAND
OUTSIDE OF STATS.'
one unfamiliar with the more eral inheritance tax is a "direct
recent decisions in England and
tax upon the thing devised in the
hands of the devisee," as distinPennsylvania upon this subject,
nothing would seem more singular
guished from a mere succession
ta= 'or personal liability imposed
'than the doctrine of the principal
csep that a purely notional con- upon collaterals, taking rnider the
version-originally conceived in
will or by the intestate laws in respect to the Property so acquired,
equity merely as a useful fiction,
the better to carry out the intentions
and hence lands beyond the jurisof the testator' in adjusting the
diction are not subject to such taxation, even though the devisee be
relative rights of his beneficiaries
-- should have the effect of chang- a Pennsylvania corporation, and an
-ing the situs of property for the act expressly framed with a view to
purpose of taxation.
That the reaching such property transcends
position may be distinctly under- the legislative power: Bittinger's
stood, it may be well to state that
Estate, 129 Pa., 338; see also Com.
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
7). Cole, 52 Pa., 468.
Therefore the. soundness of the
has expressly held that the collat
1
Collateral inheritance on the property of non-resident owners, supra
(April), p. 364.
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position depends solely -upon
to be sold only for the convenience
whether the doctrine of equitable
of division between devisees. It
conversion can be invoked to was impressed with the character
change the situs of property for the of personalty so far as was necespurpose of taxation.
sary to effectuate the testator's purThat such application of the doc- pose, but no further. Every person
trine is somewhat of a novelty, and taking an interest, under a will, in
can only be justified as a legitimate
the produce of land directed to be
extension of its underlying prin- sold, is in truth a devisee, and not
ciple must, we think, be conceded.
a legatee."
"The conversion of property from
See also Hilton v, Hilton, 3 Mcone species to another by the will
Arth., 70.
of a testator," says Judge HARE in
So, in Gibbs .v Ougier, 12 Ves.;
his note to Ackroyd v. Smithson, i 413, it was held by Sir W. GRANT
Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th ed.), 1197, that a direction to sell land for
takes place onlyfortheflurPosesof specific purposes did .not have the
the will; and so far as those pur- effect of letting in simple contract
poses do not extend, or in so far as creditors. In his work on "Equity
any of them do not take effect in -Jurisprudence, "
792, Judge
fact or in law, the property is con- SToRY says that the maxim that
sidered as. remaining in its former equity regards things as done which
condition as it was in the hands of ought to be done, only-applies "in
the testator, and passes accordfavor of those who have a right to
ingly." And unquestionably, when
pray that they might be done,"
the above was written, now some
And in Walker v Denne, 2 Ves.Jr.,
thirty years ago, it correctly ex- 185, Lord Rossr.YN said that even
pressed the general opinion of both
had the direction been imperative,
bench and bar upon the subject.
to convert for the Crown so as to
Thus, in Newby v. Skinner, i Dev. enable it to take by escheat money
•& B. Eq., 488, it was held that
directed to be laid out in land,
legacies payable out of the pro- would be a "very great stretch."
ceeds of land directed to be sold
In Matson v. Swift, 8 Beav., 368,375,
abate with specific devises and not
Lord LANGDAI n held that the prowith general legacies, GASTON, J.,
ceeds of land paid to decedent's
saying: "It is sought in this case
executors under a deed of trust
to subject to the payment of debts directing the laud to be, sold, the
the proceeds of the land devised proceeds applied to certain specito the daughters, because by the fied debts and surplus paid to his
direction of the testator to sell executors, administrators and asthe land, he turned it, in the con- signs, "without any, claim in
templation of a court of equity, equity," in favor of the heir, notinto personalty and made it a part withstanding it remained actually
of his general personal estate. This unconverted at his death, were not
position, to the extent to which it subject to probate duty, saying
is pressed, is untenable. The real in regard to the doctrine of "conestate directed to be sold was, at version out and out:" "That
the time of the testator's death, expression is strictly applicable to
land. By the will it was to remain
a conversion which the Court has
land until sold, and it was directed jurisdiction to make, and will make
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only by enforcing equities and*-ex- Exchequer Chamber refused to
ecuting'trusts, which it declares or apply the doctrine of equitable
imputes, for the purfose of carry- conversion to the converse case of
ing into effect the intentions, ex- money directed to b6 laid out in
pressed or implied, of the owner of - land and held the fund subject to
legacy duty: De Lancey's Succesthe land. In the cases supposed,
sion, L. R., 4 Ex., 345, 358; S. C.,
the real estate is not, in fact,
altered at the time of the owner's
L. R-, 5 Ex., 102, 104.-'
It must also, we conceive, be
death, and equity considers not
conceded that the doctrine of the
-what might have been done, but
what ought to be done, and will principal case, as set forth in the
syllabus, is open to very grave obdqclare or act upon the trusts which
are required for the purpose of jections upon broader and less
making actual conversion, at the technical grounds. As was well
in-tance only of those who show said'by GRAY; J., in Swift's Est.,
32 (N. Y. Ct. App)., N. B. R ep.,
themselves entitled to the benefit
of 'such trusts. And we may reas- xo98 (1893): "The basis 'of the
power .to tax is the fact of an
onably ask the question, whether
after a conveyance of land in trust actual domiioft over the subject
of taxation at the time the tax
to sell, or after valid contracts for
the 'sale of land and the death of is to be imposed. The effect of
the legal owner, the.Crown can be this special tax is to take from
the property a portion, or a perentitled for its own purposes only,
to enforce'the equities between the centage of it, for the use of the
parties? If the pArties should 're- State; and I think it quite immaterial whether the tax can be prelease each other, could the Crown,
cisely classified with a taxation of
for. purposes merely fiscal, not in
the contemplation of any party, property or not. It is not a tax
upon persons. It is 'called a tax
and not required to fulfill the intention of any party, be entitled t6 upon the succession to the ownerthe benefit of trusts, which' are ship of property; still it relates to
declared or acted upon only for the and subjects-the property itself,
purpose of giving effect to the and when that is without the jurisintentions of the parties? Sup- diction of the State, inasmuch, as
posing the conversion not to have the succession is not of property
within the dominion of the State,
been-actually made, and not to be
required for "the purposes of the succession to it 'cannot -be said to
occur by permission of the State.
deed, and supposing -any equities
As to lands, this is clearly the case,
which may have existed among
persons interested in the estate to
and rights in or power over them
are derived from or through -the
have been waived or satisfied, I am
laws of the foreign State or counof opinion that the Crown would
-,not be entitled to enforce those try. As to goods and chattels it is
true; for their transmission abroad
equities for it jown purposes."
is subject to the permission of, and
A similar decision was made by
regulated by, the laws of the State
WIG.RAm, V. C., about the same
or country where actually situated.
time, in Custance v. Bradshaw, 4
Hare, 324, and upon the authority Jurisdiction over them belongs to
of these cases the Exchequer and the courts of that State or country
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for all purposes of policy, or of
administration in the interests
of its citizens or of those baving enforceable rights, and their
surrender or transmission is upon
principles of comity. When succession to the ownership of property is by permisgion of the State,
then the permission can relate only
to property over which the State has
dominion, and as to which it grants
the privilege or permission ...
Neither the doctrine of equitable
conversion of lands, nor any fiction
of situs of movables, can have any
bearing upon the question under
advisement. The question of the
jurisdiction of the State to tax is
one of fact, and cannot turn upon
theories or fictions, which, as it has
been observed, have no place in a
well-adjuqsted system of taxation."
See also Cooley Taxation (2d
ed.), P. 5, 19, 159.
Moreover, it may well be said
that propeity beyond the jurisdiction may also be taxed by the State
of actual situs. The doctrine of
the principal case, therefore, subjects such property to double taxation, and for that reason, if for no
other, should be avoided. Furthermore, if the doctrine of equitable
conversion can be invoked by the
State, there would seem to be no
sound reason why it may not be
invoked by the executors to exempt
the estate from the tax. Could a
testator exempt his personal estate
from taxation by an imperative
direction to his executors to sell
and invest the proceeds in real
estate beyond the jurisdiction?
Would the State admit, in such
case, that the giftwas realty beyond
its jurisdiction? If so, it would
seem to be true, as suggested by
RANsom, Sur., in Swift's Appeal,
16 N. Y., Supp. 195, that, "to
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support the application of the
doctrine of equitable conversion in
determining the extent of liability
to this tax, it must be held to have
been the intention of the legislature to permit testator to determine
for himself whether the devolution of title should be subject or
exempt."
Such are some of the objections.
to the doctrine set forth in the syllabus of the principal case: nevertheless, however, it is submitted
that both Miller v. Com., iii Pa.,
321, and Williamson's Estate, were
well decided, and that the frue principle to be deduced therefrom is
consistent alike with equity and
common sense.
In Miller v. Com., iii Pa., 322,
the testator, after certain specific
devises and bequests, devised and
bequeathed all the rest and residue
of his property, real, personal, and
mixed, to his executors to sell, and
after paying debts and funeral ex-,
penses therefrom, to divide the
residue as thereafter directed. It
was held that the value of lands in
Virginia and Kentucky, which
formed a part of the residuary
estate, and of which testator died
seised, should be included in the
appraisement.
So in the principal case the proceeds of sales of both reai and personal property derived from any
part of the property, together with
all rents and income, are indiscriminately blended, and by the express
provisions of the will are to constitute a part of the residuary
estate. The distinguishing characteristic of both wills is an imperative direction to convert, not for
the payment of particular legacies,
or for any other particular purpose,
but for the general purposes of
administration.
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In Miller v. Com., this is apphrent from the direction to pay all'
debts, funeral expenses, and legacies from the mixed fund; in the
principal case it appears from the
provision that the proceeds ofrealty
shall be considered a part of the
residuary estate, and as such be applied indiscriminately with other
p'ersonalty to the payment of legacies.
By such direction the testator
must be taken to have intended a
conversion out and out, or, inother words, to give the proceeds
of his realty the quality of personalty, not merely for the particular
purposes of the will, but to all intents and purposes. 'It is submitted that it by no means follows'
from the decision that a direction
to sell land beyond the jurisdiction,
and divide the proceeds between
A,i B and C, would subject their
legacies to the tax.. The sole purpos& of such a direction would be
the convenience of division. ,In
such casetoaccomplishtheobjectof
the testator, it would not be neces-'
sary for the executor to transmit
the proceeds to the State of domicile, nor if so transmitted would it
be either necessary or desirable
to include them in their general
accounts. Under such a direction
the executors always deal with the
proceeds of the realty by virtue
of the special power rather than as
forming a part of the geneiral personal estate. Such an extension of
the principle of Miller v. Com.
would be unwarranted by the decision, and open to every objection
that can be urged against invoking
the doctrine of equitable conversion for the purpose of changing
the situs of property for fiscal objects. To reason froni Miller v.
Com., and the principal case to such

a doctrine, would be to reason from
a case in which the conversion was
for all intents and purposes to one
in which it was- limited to a particular purpose. It is, therefore,
submitted that the real principle of
these cases is not, as stated in the
syllabus to Miller v. Com., izi Pa.i
321 : Where a testator domiciled
in this Commonwealth devises land
situated without the Commonwealth to be sold to pay pecuniary
legacies, the legacy will pass to
the'legatee as money and subject
to the law of the testator's domi.cile, and hence will be subject to
the collateral inheritance tax.
But may be more 'accurately
stated thus: Where a testator
directs his real estate outside the
State to be sold, and the proceeds
blended with, his general personal
estate so as to constitute a common
fund for the general purposes of
administration, such realty will be
held to have been conuerted into
personalty for allpurposes, and as
such subject to the collateral inheritance tax. As thus stated, it
is believed that the doctrine is free
from objection, and is sustained by'
the English authorities.
In Att.-Gen. v. Holford, zo Price,
426, it was held by the Exchequer
that a devise of real and personal
property to trustees to sell the
same, the proceeds to be deemed a
part of testator's residuary estate,
and "go in aid, if necessary, of the
rest of his property"' in discharge
of pecuniary, legacies subjected
the realty to legacy duty although
it remained unsold, THompsoN,
C. B., expressly placing the decision upon the ground that the
direction to sell worked a conversion
"out and out" or for all purposes.
His words are: "This- is not a
bequest of the property in question,
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directing it to be sold with a view
solely to the payment of debts, but
it is directed to be sold in all events,
and to be turned into money. The
profits arising therefrom were, by
the will, to go in aid of the rest of
his property, if necessary, in discharge of his pecuniary legacies;
but it is not directed to be sold for
that purpose merely, but generally
to be sold, and the money to go as
residue of his personal estate."
o the same effect is Williamson
v. Advocate-Gen., io Cl. & F., where
the fund was held sulject to legacy
duty upon the ground that a like
direction worked a conversion for
all purposes, Lord BROUGHAM saying, p. x x6: "I think that in every
respect it (the estate) was money.
In respect of the succession it
would go, not to the heir, but to the
nextofkin. Ifso, itwasmoneyin
respect of revenue, and was liable
to the pdyment of the duty." In
Att.-Gen. v. Lomas, L. R. 9, Ex.
29, it whs held that under a direction to contert real and personal
property to form a mixed fund to
pay debts, funeral and testamentary
expenses and legacies, the residue
to be held on certain trusts which
failed, that portion of the proceeds
of realty which passed to testator's
heir by reason of the failure of the
trusts, was subject to probate duty
upon the ground that by the creation of a mixed fund the whole
was "stamped with the character

of money."
Upon the same principle it has
been held that as under the decisions of the Court of Chancery,
partnership real estate is to be
regarded as personalty for all purposes, the interest of a deceased
partner therein is subject to legacy
duty even though the land remain
unsold or is beyond the jurisdiction:
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Forbes v. Steven, L. R., Io Eq.,
178; Stokes v. Dacroz, 62 L., N.
S., 176; Att.-Gen. v. Hubbuck, L.
R., Q. B., 488. It had already
been held in Att.-Gen. v. Brunning, 8 H. L. Cas., 243, that money
received by executors virtute officii
under a contract of sale made by.
their testator'was subject to probate duty. In Att.-Gen. v. Ailesbury, L. R., 12 App. Cas.,'672, it
was held upon the principle of
these cases that the value of lands
purchased with the money of a
lunatic by his committees under
an order of the Lords Justices
having jurisdiction in lunacy,
which provided that the land
should be held in trust for his
executors, administrators and assigns, and should "to all intents
and purposes be considered as part
of the personal estate," was subject
to probate duty.
In view of these decisions, it is
submitted that Watson v. Swift, 8
Beav., 368, Custance v. Bradshaw,
4 Hare, 324, and DeLancey's succession, in so far as they sustain
the position that there may be a
conversion out and out, or for all
purposes except fiscal, or as it has
been put by Lord Justice JAMES,
''a conversion for every one except
for the crown" must be regarded
as overruled: Att-Gen. V. Ailesbury, L. R. 12, App. Cas., 696;
Forbes v. Steven, L. R., io Eq.,
192.

On the other hand it seems
equally clear that unless the conversion is out and out the Crown
has no claim. Indeed, inWilliamson v. Advocate-Gen., io Cl. & F.,
15, 16, Lord BROUGRAM seems to
have been of opinion that the
Crown's right to probate and legacy
duty depended upon the conversion
being sufficiently complete to ex-
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clude the rule in Ackroyd v. Sniithson, i Lead. Cas. Eq., f171
It has since been held, however,
that the conversion is sufficiently
complete when the proceeds of the
real and personal property are to.
be indiscriminately blended for the
purpose of, creating a single fund
for administration even though the
heir be entitled to the undisposed of
interest underAckroyd v. Smithson
in case gome of the trusts fail; for
tle creation of a mixed fund for
this purpose made it a duty to sell
in all events and stamped the whole
"with the character of. money,".
and as such it passed to the heir's
administrators: Att.-Gen. v. Lomas,
L. R., 9 Ex., 29.
Therefore, the corrected statement of the principle of Miller v.
Com., and Williamson's Estate, as
distinguished from the statement
contained inthe syllabi, is sustained
by the most approved English anth6rities.
'Furthermore, it should be observed that this restricted application of the doctrine of equitable
conversion to the situs of property
for taxation, while technically correct, is free from most of the objections that may be justly urged
against its application to cases in
which the conversion is for special
or particular purposes. To the
objection that the situs of property
for the purpose of taxation should
beone of fact, not of fiction, it
may well be replied that the doctrine'of equitable conversion once
properly invoked for the purpose of
converting the land out and' out it
becomes personal property for all
purposes, and the actual situs,
therefore, yields to the situs of
domicile. Moreover, without regard to the doctrine that theactual.
situs of personal property yields to

thesitus of domicile, it may well be
said that the testator, by directing
the proceeds of the sale to be
blended with his residuary personal
estate for the general purposes of
administration, has rendered it
necessary for the executors to
transmit them to his domicile, and
has thereby relieved the Court from
all difficulty in enforcing its decree.
If it be said that this assumes
that jurisdiction depends upon the
situs of property at the time of decree instead of at death (Drayton's
App., 61 Pa., 172), itmay be replied
that as it would be the duty of the
executors to con'ert and transmit
equity.may well regard that as done
which ought ,to be- done, and con'sider the .proceeds at the situs of
domicile at the time of testator's
decease. The objection that the
construction adopted might lead to
taxation at both the actual and
legal situs is sufficiently answered
by the suggestion that the existence
of such a possibility affords no
ground for altering the construction if otherwise sound. Double
taxation necessarily, results from
the doctrine adopted in nearly all
the States, that for the purpose of
taxation personal property beyond
the jurisdiction belonging to residents is governed by the situs of
domicile, while property within the
jurisdiction belonging to non-residents is governed by its actual
situs: 32 Am. If. Reg., 370.
If it be objected-that if the doctrine of equitable conversion
applies to subject to the tax land
beyond the jurisdiction directed to
be converted into money, the converse proposition must be equally
true; and money directed to be
laid out in land beyond the jurisdictign should be exempt, it may
be said that while this would seem

